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Abstract 
This paper examines the potential costs of a ceiling on the use of flexibilit y mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol using POLES, 
a partial equilibrium model of the world energy system. The results suggest that if emission trading were restricted to Annex 
I countries. halving the traded volume would increase costs by 11 billion S/year. If emission trading were to o perate at a global level. 
reducing the trade to half the perfect market volume would increase annual costs by 12 billion $/year. Global carbon emissions might 
howe,·er be I% lower. The sensiti\'ity of the results is discussed . .[ 2000 El sevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
Ker1rords: Climate; Emission trading: Costs 
I. Introduction 
The Kyoto protocol to the UN-FCCC provides for the 
use of so-called flexible mechanisms to meet the agreed 
greenhouse gases reduction commitments (UNFCCC, 
1997). These include international emission trading. joint 
implementation (JI) and the clean development mecha-
ni sm (COM). The major advantage of these mechanisms 
is that they arc designed to allow the possibility of meet-
ing the Kyoto commitments at lower costs. The prin-
ciples. rules and modalities for the use of these 
mechanisms arc however still under discussion. Different 
perceptions exist between especially the USA on the one 
hand and notably the EU on the other. One of the most 
controversial issues is the fact that the EU insists not 
only that flexibility instruments should be supplemental 
(that is. domestic actions should provide the main means 
of meeting the emission reduction commitments) but also 
that this should be accomplished by a concrete ceiling on 
the use of these flexibility instruments. Such a ceiling on 
the transfers of allowed (production) quotas was also 
originally part of the Montreal Protocol on ozone deplet-
ing substances (Klaassen, 1999). So far the USA and its 
allies. the so-called JUSCANZ group (consisting of 
Japan, USA, Canada, Australia, Norway and New 
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Zealand as well as the Russian Federation) have fiercely 
opposed such a limitation on flexibility. 
The purpose of this paper is to give a sound quantitat-
ive analysis of the potential costs and environmental 
benefits of introducing a ceiling on trading. For this 
purpose a new sectoral (or partial equilibrium) model of 
the world energy system called POLES is used. 
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 de-
scribes the model and data used. Section 3 introduces the 
scenarios. Section 4 describes and analyses the results 
obtained. Section 5 discusses the sensitivity of the results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Methodology: the POLES model 
2.1 . fnlroduction 
Prospective outlook for the long-term energy system 
(POLES) is a simulation model for the development of 
long-term (2030) energy supply and demand scenarios for 
the different regions of the world (Criqui el al., 1996; 
European Commission, 1996). The model structure cor-
responds to a hierarchical system of interconnected mod-
ules consisting of three levels: (i) international energy 
markets; (ii) regional energy balances; and (iii) national 
energy demand, new technologies, electricity production 
and primary energy production systems. The main 
exogenous variables are GDP and population for each 
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country/ region, the price of energy being endogenised in 
the international energy market modules. The dynamics 
of the model correspond to a recursive simulation pro-
cess in which energy demand and supply in each nation-
al/regional module respond with different lag structures 
to international price variations in the preceding periods 
(sec Fig. I). In each module, behavioural equations take 
into account the combination of price effects and 
techno-cconomic constraints, time lags and trends. 
The remainder of this section will describe the different 
modules in POLES followed by an explanation of the 
estimation of pollution control costs with and without 
ceilings on the volume of emissions traded through the 
three llcxibility mechanisms. 
2.2. Descriplion of 111od11/es 
In the current version of the model, the world is 
divided into 14 main regions: North America, Central 
America. South America. European Union, Rest of West-
ern Europe. Former Soviet Union. Central Europe. 
North Africa, Middle-East. Africa South of Sahara. 
South Asia , South East Asia. Continental Asia and Paci-
fic OECD. For each region. the model consists of four 
main modules dealing with: final energy demand by sec-
tor. new and renewable energy technologies. the electric-
ity and conventional energy and transformation system 
and. finally. primary energy supply. Integration of these 
modules is ensured in the energy markets module of 
which the main inputs arc the import demands and 
GDP 
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Fig. I. Schematic O\'en· i~\\" of the POLES 2 model. 
export capacities of the different regions. One world 
market is considered for the oil market (the .. one great 
pool" concept), while three regional markets (America. 
Europe and Asia) are distinguished for coal and gas, in 
order to take into account different cost, markets and 
technical structures. 
Final energy demand simulation combines the impacts 
of price and activity level changes with autonomous 
technological trends, at a relatively disaggregated sec-
toral level. Interfuel substitution equations account for 
both rigidities implied by existing equipment as well as 
llexibility in interfuel substitution for new equipment. In 
the detailed demand model for the main countries or 
regions, the consumption of energy is disaggregated into 
11 different sectors. These sectors are homogenous from 
the point of view of prices, activity variables, consumer 
behaviour and technological change. In each sector. en-
ergy consumption is calculated separately for substitut-
able fuel s and for electricity. Each demand equation 
combines income (or activity variable) elasticities, price 
elasticities. technological trends and. when necessary. 
saturation effects. The activity variables for each sector 
arc deduced from exogenous assumptions about eco-
nomic and population growth. Price elasticities are para-
meteriscd and the structure of the equations takes 
account of short- and long-term elasticities, with a dis-
tributed lag structure. and of asymmetries in price effects. 
Price effects thus depend on whether the price to the final 
user increases or decreases. Quantitative and qualitative 
analyses arc used to incorporate trends or saturation effects. 
The new and renewable energy module recognises the 
difference between technical and economic potentials as 
well as the time constants which characterise the diffu-
sion processes. At the same time it introduces clements 
such as .. learning-curves" and "niche-markets" which 
allow for a truly dynamic approach to the development 
and diffusion of these technologies. The module distin-
guishes 10 generic technologies which are representative 
of the solutions to be implemented in different types of 
countries and might have a non-negligible quantitative 
contribution in the long-term development of energy 
systems. The time horizon of the model (2030), in fact, 
makes it possible to consider that, given their develop-
ment over time, technologies that might have a signifi-
cant role over this horizon should today be at least 
identified and beyond the first stages of development. 
The electricity system in any country is not only one of 
the main energy consuming sectors but probably also the 
major sector for interfuel substitution. Because of the 
particularly long lifetime of the equipment, this sector 
presents a higher price-elasticity in the long-term than in 
the short term. To reflect the capacity constraints in the 
production of electricity the module simulates the evolu-
tion of existing capacities at each period as a function of 
equipment development decisions taken in the preceding 
periods and of the anticipated demand and costs at the 
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corresponding time. The identification of 12 technologies 
currently accounts for the future development of key 
technological options in the different regions of the 
world . The electricity load curve is endogenous and de-
duced from sectoral demand through the use of load 
coefficients for two typical days of the year. 
Oil and gas production is simulated for each region 
using a full discovery-process model for the main produ-
cing countries and a more compact model for minor 
producing countries or regions. For each main producing 
country, the available data cover the estimates of 
ultimate recovera ble resources for oil and for gas, the 
cumulative drilling and cumulative production since the 
beginning of oil a nd gas activity and the evolution of 
rese rves. Cumulative discoveries are then calculated as 
the sum of cumulative production and remaining re-
serves. For countries outside OPEC ("the fringe") current 
production is then deduced from existing reserves 
th ro ugh the a pplicatio n of a depiction ratio. OPEC 
countries act as the "swing producers" and adjust their 
production level to world demand after taking into ac-
count the production of non-OPEC countries. The pro-
cess is almost similar for natural gas and coal, except that 
swing producers arc identified as the key suppliers on the 
main regional markets for natural gas and coal: America, 
Europe a nd Africa, and Asia . Gi ven the time ho rizon of 
the model, rese rve constraints will not be effective for 
coal. and thus coal production is modelled with the use of 
market sha res on the three main regional markets for the 
large S\1·ing producers. 
The endogenisation of international energy prices is 
one of the key features of the POLES 2 model. Interna-
tional price equations are thus at the ve ry heart of the 
recursive process \\"hich accounts for the dynamics of the 
lagged adjustments of energy demand and supply. The oil 
price is calculated at the world level; it is considered to 
depend in the short run on the variations in the capacity 
utilisation ra te of the Gulf countries and in the medium 
and long run on the world average reserve-to-production 
ratio. The price of natural gas on each import market 
depends on the variation in the reserve to production 
ratio of its "core suppliers" and of the transport cost for 
the corresponding market. Coal production is essentially 
demand driven because with the time horizon of the 
model, coal supply is considered not to be subject to 
rese rve or resource constraints. Variations in the price of 
coal in some key producer countries reflect increasing 
supply costs along the expansion path of production. 
Variations in international coal prices are derived from 
the variations in the production costs of these key pro-
ducer count ries. 
2.3. Esti111atio11 of pollutio11 co11trol costs 
Estimation of the pollutio n control costs of meeting 
the Kyoto Protocol requirements is based on the deriva-
tion of regional pollution control cost functions in the 
POLES model. In practice, this is done by setting differ-
ent levels of explicit pure carbon taxes in the model and 
simulating the resulting impacts on regional C02 emis-
sions. This makes uses of the equivalence of permit prices 
and carbon taxes under perfect information on pollution 
control costs. Fig. 2 shows a set of examples of regional 
cost functi ons generated by POLES depicting marginal 
costs as functi ons of the (relative) reduction in emissions 
compared to the reference (or Business-as-Usual) emis-
sions in the year 2010. Total annual pollution control 
costs can be calculated by taking the integral of the area 
below the cost functi on up to the relevant required per-
centage reduction for each region. 
Simulations of the use of emission trading (which is 
used in the remainder of the paper as shorthand for a ll 
the different forms of flexibilit y in the Kyoto Protocol) 
are relatively straightforward if the usual assumptions of 
perfect markets are assumed to be valid. Countries 
minimize costs, transaction costs and market power arc 
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absent, and information is perfect so that marginal costs 
are equalized across all countries for meeting a given 
overall limit (as specified in the Kyoto Protocol) on the 
greenhouse gas emissions of the countries in question. 
How can these regional cost functions now be used to 
simulate the implementation ofa ceiling on the volume of 
emissions each region can trade (that is buy or sell)? This 
is related to the way the ceiling is specified. Options 
under discussion are the specification of a ceiling on the 
volume of emissions traded as a percentage of the 1990 
(base year) emissions, as a percentage of the allocated 
emission budget in the future (the period 2008-2012) or 
as a combination of the two. It is sufficient for our 
analysis that such ceiling on the amount of emissions 
traded can be translated directly into an additional con-
straint on the total vo lume of emissions in each region 
(after abatement). This implies that the level of emissions 
has to be in between a certain maximum and a certain 
minimum level (depending on whether the country would 
buy or sell emission permits). To give an example, for 
Japan the Kyoto Protocol mandates a 6% emission 
reduction for the basket of six greenhouse gases. The 
analysis in this paper is restricted to C02 so we assume 
that the same reductions apply also for this greenhouse 
gas separately. This assumption was made because we do 
not yet know what the "size" of reductions will be for 
each greenhouse gas in each country. Preliminary data 
for the EU suggest that this might imply that the costs of 
meeting the Protocol could be 5-10% higher when pos-
sible reductions in the five non-C0 2 greenhouse gases 
are also taken into account. In view of the projected 
increase in C0 2 emissions up to the year 2010 the Ja-
panese commitment would, without trading, require a re-
duction in emissions in 2010 of around 25% relative to 
the projected business-as-usual level (or a marginal cost 
of around 225S/ ton C, see Fig. 2). With full trade globally 
(no restriction whatsoever) Japan would buy emission 
reductions somewhere else and would reduce domestic 
emissions only 5% below its business-as-usual (BAU) 
level for 2010 at a cost of around 25 $/ ton C (see Fig. 2). 
Setting a ceiling on the volume of emissions traded of, for 
example, 10% of the 1990 emissions would for Japan 
imply (given the expected BAU 2010 emissions) that its 
domestic emissions should be at least 13% lower than its 
2010 BAU level. The cost functions genera ted by the 
model then immediately allow us to calculate the corre-
sponding marginal cost (which is around 80 $/ ton carbon 
in Fig. 2 for this specific Japanese example). In view of the 
assumed perfect knowledge of the 2010 BAU emissions it 
is thus straighforward to translate ceilings on the vol-
umes of emissions traded into additiona l constraints on 
the domestic level of emissions. 
Less obvious is what happens to the permit price in the 
case of restrictions on the volumes of emissions traded. 
This is so since the ceiling would create a wedge between 
the price the buyer is willing to pay for a permit and the 
Price r 
A 8~upply Pd+----~ "-..."-... p· 
Ps 
Qc a· Quantity Traded 
Fig. 3. A ceiling on emission trading. 
minimum asking price (reflecting the marginal costs) of 
the seller. Fig. 3 illustrates this. The figure depicts the 
demand and supply of permits. Demand and supply 
functions rellect the (marginal) cost functions of the re-
gions. Whether countries end up on the buyer (demand) 
side o r the supply side is determined by their cost func-
tions and the initial distribution of permits as set tled in 
the Kyoto Protocol. With a perfect permit market the 
equilbrium price would be P* and the equilibrium 
amount of emissions traded would be Q*. If a ceiling 
would restrict the traded amount to Qc, the price would 
end up between the maximum price (Pd) that prospective 
buyers would be prepared to pay and the minimum price 
the sellers would be asking (P,). The welfare loss in this 
case wou ld be equal to the additional pollution control 
costs and would be equal to the area ABC. In this particu-
lar case the situation is somewhat more complicated 
since it is not the total volume of emission permits that is 
restricted but the individual demands and the individual 
supplies. It is also not yet clear whether in practice only 
demands will be restricted, which might be more in line 
with the notion of supplemental in the Protocol, or also 
supplies of countries. We will return to this issue in detail 
in the discussion section. This shows that determining an 
equilibrium price in this situation is not straightforward 
and the model results can only be used to suggest a price 
range (as in Fig. 3). Fig. 3, however, shows that this only 
affects the distribution of the potential welfare losses of 
a ceiling since the overall losses are known and equal to 
the area ABC. 
3. The scenarios 
3.1. Introduction 
The reference scenario for the current analysis is the 
POLES Business-as-Usual (BAU) scenario for the year 
2010 without constraints on greenhouse gas emissions. 
D. Gusbin et al. / Energy Policy 27 (1999) 833-844 837 
The POLES BAU scenario was revised in March 1998 to 
align the predictions for the Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
with recent !EA energy forecasts (!EA, 1997). 
According to the BAU scenario, C0 2 emissions are 
expected to increase in 2010by 15.5% in the EU, by 13% 
in Annex I countries, and by 51 % worldwide compared 
to I 990 levels. C02 emissions in those countries of the 
Former Soviet Union which are in Annex I (indus-
trialised countries with an emission reduction commit-
ment under the Kyoto Protocol) would decline by about 
25% between 1990 and 2010 without any additional 
action due to economic restructuring. The BAU scenario 
includes energy price increases in the framework of the 
overall price reform in Russia and Ukraine. This emis-
sion reduction without explicit climate policy (but defi-
nitely not without costs in view of the underlying 
reductions in GDP in the FSU) is called surplus emis-
sions by some and "hot air" by others. 
In the geographic disaggregation of the POLES 
model. the world is divided into 14 main regions. some of 
them being further divided into sub-regions, i.e .. coun-
tries or group of countries. Some Annex I countries that 
arc combined in POLES sub-regions (e.g., Australia, 
New Zealand. Poland. Hungary, Czech Republic and 
Slovakia: Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Croatia) may 
have difTcrcnt quantified emission limitation or reduction 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. For this reason 
the Kyoto reduction commitments for POLES sub-re-
gions arc determined on the basis of individual countries' 
commitments using their respective contributions to the 
1990 C0 2 emissions of the sub-region. The Former So-
viet Union (FSU) region gathers together Annex I and 
non-Annex I countries (developing countries without an 
c111ission reduction commitment). In this case. the Kyoto 
co111mit111cnt is only applied to a percentage or FSU 
c111issions determined on the basis or 1994 C0 2 emissions 
or Annex I countries. namely Russia, Ukraine. Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia. These five countries represent 
approxi111atcly 75% or total FSU emissions of C02 . 
3 . .?. The emission trading scenarios 
Five difTercnt emission trading schemes or scenarios 
were designed that reflect how the ceiling on flexibility 
mechanism is filled in. The ceiling could pertain to all 
llexibility 111cchanisms: emission trading. JI and CDM. In 
this case the ceiling should be applied in a global context 
since CDM basically allows for flexibility between Annex 
I and non-Annex I countries. The ceiling could also relate 
to c111ission trading and joint i111plcmcntation only and 
would then afTcct trading within the group or Annex 
I countries only. 
All c111ission trading scenarios take the Kyoto targets 
o r Annex I countries as the basis. The trading of surplus 
o r "ho t air" emissions was not excluded, so that Russia 
a nd Ukraine can sell emission permits equivalent to the 
difference between their Kyoto targets and the level of 
their emissions expected under the Business-as-Usual 
scenario. For the global trading case we assume that the 
worldwide level of C02 emissions in 2010 under the 
trading regime is equal to the sum of the Kyoto commit-
ments for Annex I countries (overall reduction of 5.2%) 
and the Business-as-Usual emission levels for non-Annex 
I countries. 
The emission trading scenarios are briefly described 
below: 
I. The Kyoto Protocol without trading. 
2. Full-trade across Annex I only. This scenario assumes 
the establishment of emission trading (including JI) 
among all Annex I countries without any ceilings on 
the use of flexibility instruments. 
3. Half-trade among Annex I. This scenario assumes 
a ceiling operating on all flexibility mechanisms simul-
taneously among all Annex I countries: the traded 
volumes resulting from the full-trade scenario are re-
duced to hair. It assumes that both buyers and sellers 
are restricted in transferring the amounts they wanted. 
for example by restricting the volumes bought and 
sold to a certain percentage of either their I 990 emis-
sions or their emission reduction commitment made 
for the period 2008-2012. 
4. Full-trade worldwide (Annex I and others). This scen-
ario assumes the establishment of emission trading 
(including JI and COM) among all countries of the 
world, without any ceilings on the use of flexibility 
instruments. 
5. Half-trade worldwide. This scenario also retains the 
assumption of halving the trade volumes as in Scen-
ario 2, but among all countries. The traded volumes 
resulting from the full-trade scenario (number 3) arc 
reduced to half. 
4. The results 
4.1. Introduction 
The POLES model provides the elements for an eco-
nomic evaluation of the Kyoto emission limitation scen-
ario and of various forms ofC02 emission trading. These 
elements include the emissions before and after trade in 
each country/ region, the volumes traded, marginal 
abatement costs and total abatement costs in each coun-
try/ region with and without trade, permit prices, and the 
total expenditures for each country/ region in absolute 
figures and as percentages of GDP in 2010. 
ff the Kyoto Protocol did not allow any of the flexibil-
ity mechanisms (the no trading case) the overall efTect 
of the Kyoto targets would be a global reduction ofC0 2 
emissions in 2010 by 10% (20% in Annex I countries) 
compared to the BAU scenario. In Annex I, C02 
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emissions would be I 0% below the level of 1990. This is 
a higher reduction than the Kyoto commitment of reduc-
ing overall emissions by 5.2%. This results from the fact 
that , in this scenario, some Annex I countries (in particu-
lar Russia and Ukraine) would not be able to trade the 
difference between their baseline emissions and their 
Kyoto targets (the surplus). The order of magnitude of 
these surplus emissions is estimated to be slightly less 
than one-fourth of the overall reduction in the other 
Annex I countries (or 217 Mton C see Table I column 
"2010 Bau" and column "2010 Kyoto Protocol"). 
The total and marginal costs of meeting the Kyoto 
commitments without trading vary widely from one 
country to another. The total costs of reduction are the 
highest in Japan, the United States and Australia/ New 
Zealand (0.3, 0.35 and 0.2% of GDP in 2010, respective-
ly). They are on the order of 0.1 % of GDP in Canada and 
the European Union, and zero or close to zero in the 
other Annex I countries. The marginal costs of reduction 
are comparable in Canada, the EU, Australia/ New Zea-
land and the USA (in the range of 90-110 $/ t C), but far 
higher in Japan (245 S/ t C). For Annex I as a whole. the 
average cost of reduction is estimated at 0.2% of the 
GDP in 2010. The significant differences in marginal 
Tabk I 
Em iss ions and <.1cquisitions with trading among Annex I 
Emissions {Mton C) 
1990 2010 2010 2010 2010 
BA U Kyoto Full-trade Half-trade 
protocol 
c~inad ;,1 125 1-13 117 125 121 
Yisegrad -I (' ) 180 175 168 1-19 159 
Europc:an 9-16 1093 870 925 898 
Union 
Russ ia. 80-1 587 804 490 587 
Ukraine. 
Ualti ~s 
J ;i p~lll 319 398 300 367 334 
Rest of C~nt. 73 68 68 57 62 
Europe: in 
An .B 
Australia. 83 119 89 96 93 
New Zealand 
United States 1411 1870 1312 1521 1417 
Total Annex I 3941 4454 3729 3729 3669 
in % of 1990 113 95 95 93 
Rest of the 2111 4711 4711 4711 4710 
World 
Wo rld 6052 9164 8440 8439 8380 
in % of 1990 151 139 139 138 
'Poland. Hungary, Slovakia. Czech Republic. 
costs suggest that there are large potential gains from 
emission trading. 
4.2. A ceiling on emission trading among Annex I co11111ries 
Emission trading (including joint implementation) 
could be restricted to Annex I countries. This could de 
facto be the case if the practical use of the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism were restricted, for example, because of 
high transaction costs related to the estimation of base-
line emissions. This might be so since the COM would 
allow Annex I countries to buy reductions in non-Annex 
I countries that have no agreed emission target under the 
Protocol and the emission reduction credits obtained 
would require case-by-case approval. Experience in the 
USA suggests that this might severely limit trading 
(Klaassen, 1996). Assuming trading to be restricted to 
Annex I countries, trading would tend to be supple-
mental for most countries and for Annex I countries as 
a whole. The acquisitions of emission reductions would 
represent 25% of required emission reductions in 2010 
for the EU, 37% for the USA and 68% for Japan (sec 
Table I). About 63% of total Annex I acquisitions would 
be "hot air." The sellers of permits are Central European 
Acquisitions (T\·1ton 
C) + (buys)-lsclls) 
2010 2010 
Full-trade Half-trade 
4 
- 19 - JO 
55 28 
- 315 - 157 
67 33 
- JI -5 
6 
209 104 
0 0 
Acquisitions ( +) 
as o/u of required 
reduction 
2010 2010 
Full-trade Half-trade 
29 15 
25 12 
68 34 
21 11 
37 19 
Trade as % of 1990 
emissions 
2010 2010 
Full-trade Half-lrade 
6 
II 
6 
39 20 
21 10 
15 
4 
15 
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countries and in particular Russia/ Ukraine. They would 
contribute, respectively, 9 and 91 % to the volumes 
traded. The parties' acquisitions would constitute around 
9% of total Annex I C02 emissions in 1990. 
Restricting the scope of emission trading to Annex 
I countries only obviously results in lower cost savings 
than worldwide trading (see next section). Nevertheless, 
at nearly 23 billion$ per year, the potential costs are still 
significantly lower than the costs (54.5 billion $/ year) of 
a Kyoto Protocol with no trading whatsoever (Table 2, 
columns 2 and 3). Total cost savings in Annex I are 
estimated at 58% of the total costs of the Kyoto Protocol 
without emission trading. Cost savings vary across An-
nex I countries. Small costs savings are foreseen for 
Canada and Australia/New Zealand (i.e., a decrease in 
the total reduction cost by less than 6% compared to the 
"no trading" scenario). Moderate cost savings are ex-
pected for the EU and the USA (a cost decrease of 
around 15%). but significant cost savings are projected 
for Japan (a cost decrease of around 50%). Net revenues 
are predicted for Central Europe and the FSU. The 
permit price was estimated at 66.5 $/ t C. 
The total reduction effort of Annex l was estimated at 
0.09% of the Annex I GDP in 2010, compared to around 
0.2% of GDP without emission trading. Again, cost 
savings include the revenues of sales of surplus emissions 
by Russia and Ukraine; they represent 45 % of the total 
cost savings. 
Table 2 
Costs of emission reduction in :!010 with tr<..iding among Annex I 
Costs of reduction (in mil $1990) 
Costs of domestic reduction Expenditures 
on acquisitions 
No trade Full-trade Half-trade Full-trade 
CanaJ<.1 1168 631 907 512 
Viscgrad 4 (,.) 37 859 350 - 1263 
European 10423 5 146 7203 3664 
Union 
Russia. 0 2830 0 - 20934 
Ukraine. Battics 
Japan 11432 970 4715 4436 
Rest of Ccnl. I 338 79 - 712 
Eurori: in 
An.B 
Australi<1. 1263 763 987 419 
New Zealand 
United States 30211 11184 19374 13872 
Total Annex I 54535 22721 33613 
Cost sa,·ings 58% 38% 
in'% 
P!.!rmit pricl.! 
in S (price 
lc1ci 1990! tC 
J Pllland. Hungary. Slm·akia. Czech Republic. 
What would happen now if emission trading were 
restricted by means of a ceiling? The objective of this 
scenario is to evaluate the impact of specific ceilings on 
the amount a country can acquire or transfer through 
trading to ensure that trading is supplemental to domes-
tic actions. The ceiling on trade is defined as follows: the 
emission permits an Annex I country can acquire from or 
transfer to another Annex I country are limited to half 
the volume traded without any restrictions on trading 
(i.e. in the full-trade scenario across Annex I only). 
The results of this scenario are compared to the results 
of the full-trade scenario across Annex I only. The first 
impact of the restriction on trade - that is, in fact, the 
objective of the constraint - is to increase the contribu-
tion of domestic action. Parties' acquisitions would now 
represent less than 20% of their required reductions in 
2010 (Table l , column 10) with the exception of Japan 
where they still are expected to represent 35% (in the 
full-trade scenario, parties' acquisitions ranged from 20% 
to around 70%). Compared to the emission reduction 
efforts in 2010 acquisitions would be less important (thus 
"supplemental") than domestic action in every region. 
Compared to the 1990 emission levels, acquisitions 
would vary between 8 and 15%. It is clear that any 
suggestions to limit acquisitions to 5 or even 2.5% of the 
1990 emissions would incur even higher cost penalties. 
Reducing the traded volume to half would increase 
annual costs for the Annex I countries by 50% (from 22.7 
Costs of reduct ion as % of GDP 2010 
Total costs Costs of domestic reduct ion Total 
of red . expenditures 
Full-trade No-trade Full-trade H alf-trade Full-trade 
1143 0.145 0.078 0.t 13 0. 142 
-404 0.006 0.140 0.057 - 0.066 
88 10 0.123 0.061 0.085 0.104 
- 18104 0.000 0.144 0 - 0.920 
5405 0.311 0.026 0.t28 0.147 
- 373 0.000 0.136 0.032 -0. 150 
1182 0.209 0.126 0.163 0.t96 
25056 0.355 O. t31 0.227 0.294 
22721 0.219 0.091 0.135 0.091 
58% 
66.5 
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to 33.6 billion $/year); a cost increase of nearly 11 billion 
$/yea r compared to the full-trade case. The estimation of 
annual expenditures (domestic pollution control costs 
plus the net payments for permit acquisitions) for each 
Annex I country is not straightforward. Whereas the 
model provides the impact of restrictions on trading on 
the costs of reduction realised domestically, it cannot 
deal with the impact on expenditures on permit acquisi-
tio ns because there is no proper ma rket clearing price for 
emission permits when ceilings a re imposed . It can be 
assumed that emission trading will take place at a price 
somewhere between the lowest bid (78 S/ t C) of the bids 
of the acquiring regions and the highest minimum asking 
price (42 S/ t C) (reflecting the minimum marginal costs of 
reduction) of the group of supplying countries. If the 
pr ice were higher than 78 S/ t C some countries wo uld 
find it cheaper to reduce more emissions domes tically 
rather than to buy emission reductions abroad . If the 
price ,,·ere lowe r than 42 $/ t C some regions would not 
be prepared to ofTer emissions reductions for sa le since 
the price would not cover their marginal costs. Gi,·en thi s 
range between ask ing and o fTered prices it is also not 
clear whether the price will be higher or lo\\°Cr than the 
price of 66.5 S/ ton C obtained under the no ceiling case. 
With thi s ce iling on both sellers and buyers, global 
C0 2 emissions would be I % lower (2 % lower in Annex 
Tabk 3 
Emissions ant.! ;.1cquisitions wi 1h worldwide emission tr;.1ding 
Emi ssions (!\,hon CJ 
1990 2010 2010 2010 :!010 
BA U Kyoto Full-traJe Half-t raJe 
protocol 
Canada 125 143 11 7 138 127 
Viscgrad ~ !-') 180 175 168 166 167 
European 946 1093 870 1025 948 
Unio n 
Russia. 804 587 804 542 587 
L1kraini:. 
Balt ics 
Jap:rn 3 19 398 300 386 343 
Ri.:s 1 0f 73 68 68 63 65 
C('nt. Europi.: 
Australia. 83 11 9 89 110 100 
Ni:w Zi.:aland 
Unit t:d Sta tes 1411 1870 1312 1737 1525 
Tot a l Annex I J941 4454 37 29 4166 386 1 
in % of 1990 I t3 95 106 98 
Rest of the 21 t I 4711 4711 4273 4492 
World 
\Vo rlJ 6052 9 164 8440 8439 8353 
in % of 1990 15 1 139 139 138 
, Poland. Hungary. Slo,·aki a. Czech Republic. 
I) since part of the "hot a ir" or surplus cannot be sold. 
Overall global emissions would be around 60 Mton 
Clower than under the K yoto Protocol without trading 
since the FSU and Central and Eastern Europe are now 
not allowed to sell all the surplus emission reductions 
that will occur in the BAU case. Part of these surplus 
reductions is now no longer available to allow buyers to 
increase their emissions a bove the agreed Kyoto targets . 
4.3. A ceili11g 011 all three jlexihility 111echa11isms 1rorld1ride 
In this scenario emission trading is assumed to take 
place both between Annex I and non-Annex I countries as 
well as among Annex I and non-Annex I countries. This 
implies that if we assume a ceiling on the three flexibility 
mechanisms (emission trading. joint implementation and 
CDM) it applies to the sum of the acquisitions acquired 
(for the buyers) and to the sum of the transfe rs (for the 
sellers) through all flexibility mechanisms taken together. 
If we assume no cons traint whatsoever, the model 
results show that without any ceiling (full trade). and 
assuming a perfect permit market, the overa ll resu lt is 
that the Annex I regio n as a whole would be a net buyer 
of emission permits (around 437 Mton C). Non-Annex 
I would be a se ller of permits (see Table 3. column seven, 
labelled "Full trade"). 
Ac4uisi1ions (!\.hon 
CJ + (buysJ-(sc ll s ) 
2010 2010 
Full-tra<lt.: Half-trade 
20 10 
-2 - 1 
155 78 
- .:!61 - 131 
85 43 
-5 - 2 
21 11 
424 212 
437 219 
- 438 - 2t9 
0 0 
Acqui sitions ( +) 
as 0/o of required 
reduct ion 
2010 2010 
Full-trade Half-trade 
78°/o 39% 
70°/o 35% 
87o/n 44 % 
70% 35% 
76°/o 38% 
60% 30% 
Trade as% of 1990 
emissions 
2010 2010 
Ful l-traJe Half-trade 
1 6 '}~ s•' 
'" 1% 1% 
16% 8% 
33% 16% 
:!7°/o IYYo 
6°/o 3% 
25% 13% 
30% 15% 
11 % 6% 
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If trading were to take place worldwide, again assum-
ing a perfect competitive market without transaction 
costs, it would not necessarily be supplemental to domes-
tic action. The trade between Annex I and non-Annex 
I represents more than 50% (to be precise 60%) of total 
reductions required in Annex I countries in 2010. This 
implies that on average domestic actions from the buying 
Annex I parties would be less than 50%. This seems at 
odds with the notion of supplemental. Furthermore, as 
emission trading also takes place within Annex I, acquisi-
tions of emission permits by individual Annex I countries 
could make up to 90% of the required emission reduc-
tion in 2010 (70% for the EU, 87% for Japan and 76% 
for the USA). Within Annex I, the sellers are Central 
European countries and Russia/ Ukraine, which contrib-
ute respectively to 3% and 97% of the trade. The permit 
price for such worldwide free emission trading was esti-
mated at 24 S/ t C. 
The potential cost savings of such global emission 
trading. compared to a protocol without trade whatso-
ever, \\·ould be significant: 84% at the world level, 75% 
for Annex I and 56% for the EU (Table 4). Part of the 
Tahk 4 
Costs of emission n:Juction in :!010 with \\·orldwidc emission tr<1ding 
Costs of reduction (in mil $1990) 
Costs of domestic reduction Expenditures 
on acquisitions 
No tr<1dc Full-trade Half-tr~1dc Full-trade 
Crnada 1168 70 476 490 
Vi scgr:id 4 ( .. ) 37 85 61 - 58 
European 10423 822 3793 3722 
Union 
Ru"si;1. Ukr:1inc. 0 480 0 - 6286 
Baltics 
J;Jp;111 1143:! 144 3281 2047 
Rest of Cc:nl. 57 18 - 110 
Euwrc in An .B 
Australia. 1263 !OS 512 so~ 
f\:C\\ z .. :aJanJ 
L'nitcJ States 30211 1702 10934 10186 
Total Annc.x I 54535 34(,8 19075 10495 
Co:-.\ sa,·ings 9-ln/ii 65°/o 
in °o 
Rest or the 0 5076 1244 - 10495 
\\'0rld 
World 54535 8544 20319 
Cost sa,·ings 84 % 63 % 
in ~o 
Pr:rmit price 
in S (prict.:: lcwl 
19901 tC 
~ f\\l;inJ. Hungary. Slm·aki~. Czech Republic. 
Annex I cost savings results from the revenues of sales of 
surplus ("hot air") emissions by the FSU; these savings 
represent slightly more than I 0% of the estimated poten-
tial cost savings. At the world level, the total reduction 
effort is estimated at 0.02% of the world GDP in 2010, 
compared to 0.1 % in the "no trading" scenario. For 
Annex I, efforts are estimated at 0.06% of the Annex 
I GDP in 2010, compared to 0.2% in the "no trading" 
scenario. For the EU, costs as a percentage of GDP 
would be reduced by half, from 0.1 % of the EU GDP in 
2010 to 0.05%. 
Let us assume that under the ceiling on flexibility 
countries can only trade half of what they would have 
traded under the perfect competitive full-trade case. In 
practice this implies that we set a country-specific ceiling 
on the volume of emission permits each party can buy 
either as a percentage of its 1990 (base year) emissions or 
its emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol (or a combination of both). This makes sense 
since setting a uniform ceiling (as a percentage of 1990 
emissions) would tend to penalise some countries (e.g., 
Japan) more than others and would likely be politically 
Costs of reduction as % of GDP 2010 
Total Costs of domestic reduction Total 
cxpcnditun:s expenditures 
Full-trade No trade Full-trade Half-trade Full-trade 
560 0.145 0.009 0.059 0.070 
28 0.006 0.014 0.014 0.005 
4544 0.123 0.010 0.045 0.054 
- 5805 0.000 0.024 0 - 0.295 
2191 OJI! 0.004 0.089 0.060 
- 53 0.000 0.023 0.007 - 0.021 
612 0.209 0.018 0.085 0.101 
11887 0.355 O.G20 0.128 0.140 
13963 0.219 0.014 0.077 0.056 
74% 
- 5419 0 0.019 0.005 - 0.020 
8544 0.104 0.016 0.039 0.016 
84% 
24 
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unacceptable. A differentiated percentage is more in line 
with the differentiation of emission reductions already 
included in the Protocol itself. 
The results of this scenario are compared to the results 
of the full-trade scenario worldwide. With the specified 
restrictions on trading, trading would become supple-
mental (more than 50% of the overall reductions re-
quired in 2010 in Annex I would be done domestically). 
Table 3 (in particular column 10 labelled "Half-trade") 
shows that all regions would acquire less than 50% of 
their needed emission reductions relative to the BAU 
case in 2010. 
If trading were to take place worldwide, reducing the 
traded volumes to half would mean that annual costs 
would be more than twice as high (or 12 billion S/year) at 
the world level. Global pollution control costs would 
increase from 8.5 to 20.3 billion S/ year. If we look at the 
domestic pollution control costs only (without the expen-
ditures on emission trading or emission permits) cost 
increases would be significant in Japan (more than a fac-
tor of 20 higher), followed by Canada, USA, Australia, 
New Zealand and the EU (around a factor five higher). 
As in the case of a ceiling on trading in Annex I coun-
tries, it is not possible to fix the equilibrium permit price. 
There is a gap between the willingness to pay of the 
buyers (at most 54 $/ ton C) and the marginal costs of the 
suppliers (at least 21 $/ ton CJ. 
As a result of this limit on the volume traded, global 
C01 emissions would be I% lower (7% lower in 
Annex I) than in the Kyoto Protocol with full trading 
since part of the "hot air" cannot be sold. Total global 
emissions are around 87 Mton C lower. A quick calcu-
lation shows that the implicit benefit needed per ton of 
carbon to outweigh the additional costs of this restriction 
on the nexibility mechanism would be around 135 
USS/ ton carbon. This appears to be an implicit benefit 
(or avoided damage cost) estimate which is in the higher 
part of the estimates (0.3 to 221 S/ ton C) reviewed by the 
I PCC and above the average or most likely estimates 
that they collected (Pearce et al., 1996, p. 215). It appears 
that the same benefit, achieved in this calculation by 
putting a ceiling on the nexibility mechanisms, could 
have been obtained at less cost by agreeing on lower 
initial emission ceilings in the Kyoto Protocol while 
maintaining full flexibility. One could also suggest, how-
ever, that if nexibility is constrained marginal costs 
would be higher than the marginal benefits of the Proto-
col and the targets of the Kyoto protocol are inefficient 
and should be revisited . 
5. Discussion 
A number of assumptions might have an important 
impact on the results obtained: the specification of the 
ceiling, the estimate of the level of surplus emissions in 
the Former Soviet Union, market power, transaction 
costs, banking and the assumptions on cost-minimising 
behaviour. 
The way the ceiling is specified in the model calcu-
lations implies that the ceiling applies to both buyers as 
well as sellers. The ceiling could also take the form of 
a limit only on the volume of permits each buyer could 
obtain and not on the volumes sellers can transfer. In this 
case one would expect two important impacts. First, 
pollution control costs and permit prices would tend be 
lower since this design would not artificially limit the 
number of relatively cheap emission reductions that 
countries in the FSU and Eastern Europe could offer. 
For example, Table 3 shows that in the half-trade case 
acquisitions from Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic States 
would be restricted to 131 Mton C. Without restriction 
on the volume sold by each individual seller this amount 
would certainly be higher. This is so because the surplus 
emissions (the "hot air") that are available at zero mar-
ginal costs in these FSU countries would be at least 
215 Mton C. Second, this implies that the 1% reduction 
in overall carbon emissions expected in the case of a ceil-
ing on both buyers and sellers would also be smaller if 
not fully absent. This is so since a bigger part of these 
surplus emissions, if not all, would now be sold to reduce 
emissions elsewhere since these are the cheapest reduc-
tions. 
The estimates of the surplus emissions in the FSU arc 
uncertain since future emissions are inherently uncertain. 
A comparison with emission estimates of a recently com-
pleted IJASA-WEC study (Nakicenovic et al., 1998; Vic-
tor et al., 1998) suggest that the size of the surplus 
emissions in Russia and the Ukraine might vary between 
2 and 223 Mton C in 2010. The lower value would occur 
under a high growth, coal intensive scenario. The higher 
value would apply for a modest growth case, which in 
the reviews of the IJASA-WEC study was believed to be 
the most likely variant for the FSU (Victor et al., 1998). 
The higher value of 223 Mton C corresponds very well 
to the estimates of 227 Mton C used in the POLES 
model runs. The overall emission estimates for Annex 
I countries under the BAU case are also quite similar to 
the modest growth scenario of the IJASA-WEC study 
but lower than the high growth case. This would point in 
the direction of possibly higher costs of meeting the 
Kyoto Protocol and also suggest a higher potential 
cost penalty for putting a ceiling on emission trading 
among Annex I countries. Emission estimates for non-
Annex I countries in the JJASA-WEC study are system-
atically lower than those in the POLES model. This 
suggests that these countries might have less cheap car-
bon emissions for sale than expected in the POLES 
model, again driving up the price. In conclusion, for high 
growth scenarios, the potential cost penalty of a ceiling 
on emission trading might be higher than the POLES 
model shows. 
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Market power might be an issue of importance certainly 
if emission trading were restricted to Annex I countries. 
With trade limited to Annex I, Russia might be supplying 
70% of the emission permits (compared to 45% in the 
worldwide trading case). This might lead to monopoly 
behaviour and a limitation of the volume of permits sup-
plied in an attempt to drive up their price. This would thus 
have a similar effect as a ceiling on the volume of emissions 
traded (amounting to a ceiling of the emissions up for sale). 
Similar to the theory on exhaustible resources (Dasgupta 
and Heal, 1979) the monopolist might thus turn out to be 
the environmentalist's friend since this would imply that 
the surplus emissions offered for sale would be reduced 
and global carbon emissions would be lower. 
Transaction costs also work in the same direction as 
a ceiling on trading since they drive a wedge between the 
prices the supplier receives and the buyer is prepared to 
pay. The actual effect will depend on the form the trans-
action costs take (fixed, variable, etc.) (Stavins, 1994) and 
their levels. This might limit trade in practice and thus 
restrict the potential losses of setting a ceiling on the 
volume traded. 
An additional issue of importance is that of banking. 
The Kyoto Protocol allows the banking of emission 
reductions below the required emission reductions in the 
first commitment period (2008-2012). This has not been 
taken into account in the model runs. Experience with 
the sulfur trading program in the USA (Klaassen. 1996) 
as well as theory suggests that banking is likely to occur. 
O\·er time the demand for permits is likely to increase 
since Business-as-Usual emissions are expected to in-
crease further in 2020 and beyond (Nakicenovic et al., 
1998). Gi\·en a reduction similar to that in the Kyoto 
Protoco l. emission reduction efforts will have to be 
strengthened and marginal costs will tend to be higher. If 
Kyoto commitments arc strengthened. as is not uncom-
mon \\·ith international environmental agreements. this 
up\\·ard pressure on (future) marginal costs will increase 
and. other things being equal. banking will increase. This 
i111plies that the cost penalty of putting a ceiling on 
emission trading (if this is fixed to 1990 emiss ions or the 
Kyoto commitments) might not be so high since the 
rnlu111e traded in the first period would be lower anyway 
because or banking. 
Finally. an issue of relevance is the assumed cost min-
i111ising behaviour of the regions. It might be so that 
countries do not mini111ise costs but maximise benefits. In 
this case they \rnuld also account for any secondary 
benefits (in the form of reduced particulate or sulphur 
e111issions for example) that domestic emission reductions 
would tend to ha\·e as advantages over reductions in 
other co untries. If these domestic (marginal) benefits are 
positi\·e this implies that the demand for emission trading 
would he s111aller (a downward shift in the demand curve 
in Fig . .\).On the other hand. if these benefits also occur 
in countries supplying permits. the supply might also 
increase (since the net marginal costs of supply would be 
lower because of the domestic benefits) (an upward shift 
in the supply curve in Fig. 3). The net effect of this will 
then depend on the extent of the (secondary) benefits and 
their valuation in each region. 
In summary it appears that a different ceiling specifica-
tion (only buyers and not sellers restricted), market 
power, transaction costs and banking suggest that the 
potential cost penalty of a ceiling on emission trading 
might be smaller than the model calculations suggest. 
Uncertainty on future emissions points to perhaps higher 
costs than expected. Putting a ceiling only on the buyer 
side is (like monopoly power) likely to imply lower envir-
onmental benefits than the simulation model results sug-
gest. The effect of including (secondary) benefits in the 
behavioural assumptions is ambiguous. 
6. Concluding obserrntions 
This paper examined the potential costs and benefits of 
a specific ceiling on the use of the Kyoto flexibility 
mechanisms by both sellers and buyers, to ensure that 
these flexibility mechanisms are supplemental to domes-
tic action. 
The resu lts suggest the following conclusions if trading 
is restricted to Annex I. 
• Even without constraints on emission trading, trading 
might be supplemental except for one region (Japan); 
• Reducing the traded volume in Annex I by half would 
increase annual total Annex I costs by 50% (or 11 bil-
lion S/ycar). On the other hand, global emissions 
would be 1 % lower since part of the surplus emissions 
("hot air") cannot be sold. 
If trading were to take place worldwide, the main find-
ings are the following: 
• Without restrictions on the use of flexibility mecha-
nisms trading would no t necessarily be supplemental. 
Acquisitions could constitute up to 90% of the reduc-
tion in 2010. 
• Reducing the traded volume to half the volume traded 
in a competitive market would make the worldwide 
trading supplemental. However, the price to be paid is 
a doubling of the annual reduction costs (by 12 billion 
S( 1990)/year). Global emissions would be 1 % lower 
since part of the " hot air" cannot be sold. 
Discussion of the sensitivity of these results suggests that 
a different ceiling specification (only buyers and not sel-
lers restricted), market power, transaction costs and 
banking might imply that the potential cost penalty of 
a ceiling on emission trading might be smaller than 
the model calculations suggest. Uncertainty on future 
emiss ions points to perhaps higher costs than expected. 
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The effect of including (secondary) benefits in the behav-
ioural assumptions is not straightforward. Putting a ceil-
ing on the buyer side only is (like monopoly power) likely 
to imply lower environmental benefits than the simulation 
model results suggest. This implies that not only the level 
of the ceiling but also its design matter for welfare losses. 
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